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Texts | Liberalism vs Democracy | Tomislav Sunic (Croatia) | 23.09.2002 |
Liberalism or Democracy? Carl Schmitt and Apolitical Democracy
By Tomislav Sunic
"Les temps sont durs; les idees sont molles."
-- Francois-Bernard Huyghe, La Soft-Ideologie
Growing imprecision in the language of political discourse has turned
virtually everyone into a democrat or, at least, an aspiring democrat.
East,West, North, South, in all corners of the world, politicians and
intellectuals profess the democratic ideal, as if their rhetorical homage
to democracy could substitute for the frequently poor showing of their
democratic institutions[1] Does liberal democracy - and this is what we
take as our criterion for the "best of all democracies"-mean more
political
participation or less, and how does one explain that in liberal democracy
electoral interests have been declining for years? Judging by voter
turnout, almost everywhere in the West the functioning of liberal
democracy
has been accompanied by political demobilization and a retreat from
political participation[2].
Might it be, that consciously or
unconsciously,
the citizens of liberal democracies realize that their ballot choices can
in no substantial manner affect the way their societies are governed, or
worse, that the rites of liberal democracy are an elegant smoke screen for
the absence of self-government?
Liberal Parenthesis and the End of the Muscled State
This paper will argue both that democracy is not necessarily an
accompanying feature of liberalism and that liberal democracy may often be
the very opposite of what democracy is supposed to mean. Through the
arguments of Carl Schmitt, I shall demonstrate that: 1) democracy can have
a different meaning in liberal society than in non-liberal society, 2) the
depoliticization of liberal democracy is the direct result of voter
mistrust in the liberal political class, and 3) liberal democracy in
multi-ethnic countries is likely to face serious challenges in the future.
Over the period of the last fifty years, Western societies have witnessed
a
rapid eclipse of "hard" politics. Theological fanaticism, ideological
ferocity, and politics of power, all of which have until recently rocked
European states, have become things of the past. The influence of radical
left-wing or right-wing parties and ideologies has waned. "High" politics,
as a traditional action and interaction process between the rulers and the
ruled, and as a guide for purported national destiny, seems to have become
obsolete. With the collapse of communism in the East, modern liberal
democracies in the West appear today as the only alternative forms of
government on the barren political and ideological landscape. Moreover, in
view of the recent collapse of totalitarian ideologies, liberal democracy
seems to have gained even more legitimacy, all the more so as it
successfully accommodates differing political views. Western liberal
democracy, people believe, can satisfy diverse and disparate opinions, and
can continue to function even when these are non-democratic and
anti-liberal.
For Schmitt, liberal tolerance towards opposing political views is
deceiving. In all of his works, and particularly in Verfassungslehre and
Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, he points to
differences between liberalism and democracy, asserting that liberalism,
by
its nature, is hostile to all political projects. In liberal democracy,
writes Schmitt, "politics far from being the concern of an elite, has
become the despised business of a rather dubious class of persons."[3]
One
may add that liberal democracy does not appear to be in need of political
projects: With its vast technological infrastructure and the free market
network, argues Schmitt, liberal democracy has no difficulty in rendering
all contending beliefs and opposing ideologies inoffensive, or, at worst,
ridiculous[4].
In liberal democracy, in which most collective projects have already been
delegitimatized by belief in individualism and in the private pursuit of
economic well-being, "it cannot be required, from any thinkable point of
view, that anyone lays down his life, in the interest of the undisturbed
functioning [of this society.]"[5] Little by little, liberal democracy
makes all political projects unattractive and unpopular, unless they
appeal
to economic interests. Liberal democracy, writes Schmitt, seems to be
fitted for a rational, secularized environment in which the state is
reduced to a "night-watchman" supervising economic transactions. The state
becomes a sort of inoffensive "mini-state" ["Minimalstaat"] or stato
neutrale.[6] One could almost argue that the strength of liberal democracy
lies not in its aggressive posturing of its liberal ideal, but rather in
its renunciation of all political ideals, including its own.
To some extent, this apolitical inertia appears today stronger than ever
before, since no valid challenger to liberal democracy appears on the
horizon. What a stark contrast to the time prior to World War II, when
radical left- and rightwing ideologies managed to draw substantial support
from political and intellectual elites! Might it be that the
"Entzauberung"
of politics has gone so far as to contribute to the strengthening of
apolitical liberal democracy? Very revealing, indeed, appears the change
in
the behavior of modern elites in liberal democracies; left, right, and
center barely differ in their public statements or in their political
vocabulary. Their styles may differ, but their messages remain virtually
the same. The "soft" and apolitical discourse of modern liberal princes,
as
one French observer recently wrote, prompts the "liberal-socialist" to
exclaim: "I will die from loving your beautiful eyes Marquise." And to
this
the "socialist-liberal"responds: "Marquise, from loving your beautiful
eyes, I will die."[7] Leftwing agendas are so often tainted with rightwing
rhetoric that they appear to incorporate conservative principles.
Conversely, rightwing politicians often sound like disillusioned leftists
on many issues of domestic and foreign policy. In liberal democracy, all
parties across the political spectrum, regardless of their declaratory
differences, seem to be in agreement on one thing: democracy functions
best
when the political arena is reduced to its minimum and the economic and
juridical spheres are expanded to their maximum.
Part of the problem may result from the very nature of liberalism. Schmitt
suggests that the notions of liberalism and democracy "have to be
distinguished from one another so that the patchwork picture that makes up
modern mass democracy can be recognized."[8] As Schmitt notes, democracy
is
the antithesis of liberalism, because "democracy ... attempts to realize
an
identity of the governed and the governors, and thus it confronts the
parliament as an inconceivable and outmoded institution."[9]
Organic Democracy vs. Apolitical Democracy
True democracy, for Schmitt, means popular sovereignty, whereas liberal
democracy and liberal parliament aim at curbing popular power. For
Schmitt,
if democratic identity is taken seriously, only the people should decide
on
their political destiny, and not liberal representatives, because "no
other
constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of the
people's
will, however it is expressed."[10] Liberal democracy, argues Schmitt, is
nothing else but a euphemism for a system consecrating the demise of
politics and thus destroying true democracy. But a question arises: why,
given liberalism's history of tolerance and its propensity to accommodate
diverse groups, does Schmitt adamantly reject liberal democracy? Has not
liberalism, particularly in the light of recent experiences with "muscled
ideologies," proven its superior and humane nature?
The crux of Schmitt's stance lies in his conviction that the concept of
"liberal democracy" is semantic nonsense. In its place, Schmitt seems to
suggest both a new definition of democracy and a new notion of the
political. According to Schmitt, "democracy requires, first homogeneity
and
second-if the need arises-elimination or eradication of
heterogeneity."[11]
Homogeneity and the concomitant elimination of heterogeneity are the two
pillars of Schmitt's democracy, something which stands in sharp contrast
to
liberal party systems and the fragmentation of the body politic.
Democratic
homogeneity, according to Schmitt, presupposes a common historical memory,
common roots, and a common vision of the future, all of which can subsist
only in a polity where the people speak with one voice. "As long as a
people has the will to political existence," writes Schmitt," it must
remain above all formulations and normative beliefs. . . . The most
natural
way of the direct expression of the people's will is by approvals or
disapprovals of the gathered crowd, i.e., the acclamation."[12] To be
sure,
with his definition of homogeneous democracy that results from the popular
will, Schmitt appears to be holding the value of the traditional community
above that of civil society which, for the last century, has been the
hallmark of liberal democracy.[13] One may therefore wonder to what extent
can Schmitt's "organic" democracy be applicable to the highly fractured
societies of the West, let alone to an ethnically fragmented America.
Schmitt insists that "the central concept of democracy is the people
(Volk), not mankind [Menscheit]. . . . There can be-if democracy takes a
political form-only popular democracy, but not a democracy of mankind [Es
gibt eine Volksdemokratie und keine Menscheitsdemokratie]."[14] Naturally,
this vision of "ethnic" democracy collides with modern liberal democracy,
one of the purposes of which, its proponents claim, is to transcend ethnic
differences in pluralistic societies. Schmitt's "ethnic" democracy must be
seen as the reflection of the uniqueness of a given people who oppose
imitations of their democracy by other peoples or races. Since Schmitt's
democracy bears a resemblance to ancient Greek democracy, critics must
wonder how feasible this democracy can be today. Transplanted into the
twentieth century, this democratic anachronism will appear disturbing, not
least because it will remind some of both fascist corporate and Third
World
states with their strict laws on ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Schmitt
confirms these misgivings when he states that "a democracy demonstrates
its
political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign
and unequal that threatens its homogeneity [das Fremde und Ungleiche . . .
zu beseitigen oder fernzuhalten]."[15] Any advocate of liberal democracy
in
modern multicultural societies could complain that Schmitt's democracy
excludes those whose birth, race, or simply religious or ideological
affiliation is found incompatible with a restricted democracy. Foreign may
be a foreign idea that is seen to threaten democracy, and a foreigner may
be somebody who is viewed as unfit to participate in the body politic
because of his race or creed. In other words, one could easily suspect
Schmitt of endorsing the kind of democracy that approximates the "total
state."
Nor does Schmitt treat the liberal principles of legality with much
sympathy. In his essay "Legalitat und Legitimitat," Schmitt argues that
the
kind of liberal democracy creates the illusion of freedom by according to
each political group and opposing opinion a fair amount of freedom of
expression as well as a guaranteed legal path to accomplish its goal in a
peaceful manner.[16] Such an attitude to legal rights is contrary to the
notion of democracy, and eventually leads to anarchy, argues Schmitt,
because legality in a true democracy must always be the expression of the
popular will and not the expression of factional interests. "Law is the
expression of the will of the people (lex est quod populus jubet)," writes
Schmitt, [17] and in no way can law be a manifestation of an anonymous
representative or a parliamentarian who solely looks after interests of
his
narrow constituency. Indeed, continues Schmitt, an ethnically homogeneous
and historical people has all the prerequisites to uphold justice and
remain democratic, provided it always asserts its will.[18] Of course, one
may argue that Schmitt had in mind a form of populist democracy
reminiscent
of the 1930s' plebiscitary dictatorships which scorned both parliamentary
parties and organized elections. In his Verfassungslehre, Schmitt attacks
free parliamentary elections for creating, through secret balloting, a
mechanism which. "transforms the citizen (citoyen), that is, a
specifically
democratic and political figure, into a private person who only expresses
his private opinion and gives his vote."[19] Here Schmitt seems to be
consistent with his earlier remarks about ethnic homogeneity. For Schmitt,
the much-vaunted "public opinion," which liberals equate with the notion
of
political tolerance, is actually a contradiction in terms, because a
system
which is obsessed with privacy inevitably shies away from political
openness. True and organic democracy, according to Schmitt, is threatened
by liberal secret balloting, and "the result is the sum of private
opinions."[20] Schmitt goes on to say that "the methods of today's popular
elections [Volkswahl] and referendums [Volksentscheid] in modern
democracy,
in no way contain the procedure for genuine popular elections; instead,
they organize a procedure for the elections of the individuals based on
the
total sum of independent ballot papers."[21]
Predictably, Schmitt's view of democratic equality is dependent upon his
belief that democracy entails social homogeneity, an idea Schmitt develops
more fully in Verfassungslehre and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy.
Although liberal democracy upholds the legal equality of individuals, it
ignores the equality of rooted citizens. Liberal democracy merely provides
for the equality of atomized individuals whose ethnic, cultural, or racial
bonds are so weakened or diluted that they can no longer be viewed as
equal
inheritors of a common cultural memory and a common vision of the future.
Undoubtedly, equality and democracy, for Schmitt, are inseparable.
Equality
in a genuine organic democracy always takes place among "equals of the
same
kind (Gleichartigen)."[22] This corresponds to Schmitt's earlier assertions
that "equal rights make good sense where homogeneity exists."[23] Could
one
infer from these brief descriptions of democratic equality that in an
ethnically or ideologically fragmented society equality can never be
attained? One might argue that by transferring the political discourse of
equality to the juridical sphere, liberal democracy has elegantly masked
glaring inequality in another sphere-that of economics. One could agree
with Schmitt that liberal democracy, as much as it heralds "human rights"
and legal equality and proudly boasts of "equality of (economic)
opportunity," encourages material disparities. Indeed, inequality in
liberal democracy has not disappeared, and, in accordance with the
Schmitt's 'observations regarding the shifts in the political sphere,
"another sphere in which substantial inequality prevails (today, for
example the economic sphere), will dominate politics. Small wonder that,
in
view of its contradictory approach to equality, liberal democracy has been
under constant fire from the left and the right.[24]
To sum up, Schmitt rejects liberal democracy on several counts: 1) liberal
. democracy is not "demo-krasia," because it does not foster the identity
of the governed and the governors, 2) liberal democracy reduces the
political arena, and thus creates an apolitical society, and 3) in
upholding legal equality, and pursuant to its constant search for the
wealth that will win it support, liberal democracy results in glaring
economic inequality.
The Rule of the People or the Rule of Atomized Individuals?
From the etymological and historical points of view, Schmitt's criticism
of
liberal democracy merits attention. Democracy signifies the rule of the
people, a specific people with a common ethnic background, and not the
people construed, after the manner of some liberal democracies, as the
atomized agglomeration flowing from a cultural "melting pot." But if one
assumes that a new type of homogeneity can develop, e.g., homogeneity
caused by technological progress, then one cannot dispute the
functionality
of a liberal democracy in which the homogenized citizens remain thoroughly
apolitical: Hypothetically speaking, political issues in the decades to
come may no longer be ethnicity, religions, nation-states, economics, or
even technology, but other issues that could "homogenize" citizens.
Whether
democracy in the twenty-first century will be based on apolitical
consensus
remains to be seen. Schmitt sincerely feared that the apoliticism of
"global liberal democracy" under the aegis of the United States could
become a dangerous predicament for all, leading not to global peace but to
global servitude.[25] As of today, however, liberal democracy still serves as
a
normative concept for many countries, but whether this will remain so is
an
open question.
In view of the increased ethnic fragmentation and continued economic
disparities in the world, it seems that Schmitt's analysis may contain a
grain of truth. The American experience with liberal democracy has so far
been tolerable: that is, the U.S. has shown that it can function as a
heterogeneous multi-ethnic society even when, contrary to Schmitt's fears,
the level of political and historical consciousness remains very low. Yet,
the liberal democratic experiment elsewhere has been less successful.
Recent attempts to introduce liberal democracy into the multi-ethnic
states
of Eastern Europe have paradoxically speeded up their dissolution or, at
best, weakened their legitimacy. The cases of the multi-ethnic Soviet
Union
and the now-defunct Yugoslavia-countries in endless struggles to find
lasting legitimacy-are very revealing and confirm Schmitt's predictions
that democracy functions best, at least in some places, in ethnically
homogeneous societies.[26] In light of the collapse of communism and
fascism, one is tempted to argue that liberal democracy is the wave of the
future. Yet, exported American political ideals will vary according to the
countries and the peoples among whom they take root. Even the highly
Americanized European countries practice a different brand of liberal
democracy from what one encounters in America.
Schmitt observes that liberalism, while focusing on the private rights of
individuals, contributes to the weakening of the sense of community.
Liberal democracy typifies, for Schmitt, a polity which cripples the sense
of responsibility and renders society vulnerable to enemies both from
within and without. By contrast, his idea of organic democracy is not
designed for individuals who yearn to reduce political activity to the
private pursuit of happiness; rather, organic, classical democracy means
"the identity of the governors and the governed, of the rulers and the
ruled, of those who receive orders and of those who abide by them."[27] In
such a polity, laws and even the constitution itself can be changed on a
short notice because the people, acting as their own legislators, do not
employ parliamentary representatives.
Schmitt's democracy could easily pass for what liberal theorists would
identify as a disagreeable dictatorship. Would Schmitt object to that?
Hardly. In fact, he does not discount the compatibility of democracy with
communism or even fascism. "Bolshevism and Fascism," writes Schmitt, "by
contrast, are like all dictatorships certainly antiliberal, but not
necessarily antidemocratic."[28] Both communism and fascism strive towards
homogeneity (even if they attempt to be homogeneous by force) by banning
all opposition. Communism, for which the resolute anti-Bolshevik Schmitt
had no sympathy, can surely be democratic, at least in its normative and
utopian stage. The "educational dictatorship" of communism, remarks
Schmitt, may suspend democracy in the name of democracy, "because it shows
that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy."[29] In a true
democracy, legitimacy derives not from parliamentary maneuvers, but from
acclamation and popular referenda. "There is no democracy and no state
without public opinion, and no state without acclamation," writes Schmitt [30] By contrast, liberal democracy with its main pillars, viz.,
individual
liberty and the separation of powers, opposes public opinion and, thus,
must stand forth as the enemy of true democracy. Or, are we dealing here
with words that have become equivocal? According to Schmitt, "democratic
principles mean that the people as a whole decides and governs as a
sovereign."[31] One could argue that democracy must be a form of kratos,
an
exercise, not a limiting, of power. Julien Freund, a French Schmittian,
concurs that "democracy is a 'kratos.' As such it presupposes, just like
any other regime, the presence and the validity of an authority." [32]
With
its separation of powers, the atomization of the body politic, and the
neutralization of politics, liberal democracy deviates from this model.
Conclusion: The Liberal 'Dictatorship of Well-Being'
If one assumes that Schmitt's "total democracy" excludes those with
different views and different ethnic origins, could not one also argue
that
liberal democracy excludes by virtue of applying an "apolitical" central
field? Through apolitical economics and social censure, liberal democracy
paradoxically generates a homogeneous consumer culture. Is this not a form
of "soft" punishment imposed on those who behave incorrectly? Long ago, in
his observations about democracy in America, Tocqueville pointed out the
dangers of apolitical "democratic despotism." "If despotism were to be
established among the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a
different character; it would be more extensive and more mild; it would
degrade men without tormenting them."[33] Perhaps this "democratic
despotism" is already at work in liberal democracies. A person nowadays
can
be effectively silenced by being attacked as socially insensitive.
Contemporary liberal democracy amply demonstrates the degree to which the
economic and spiritual needs of citizens have become homogenized. Citizens
act more and more indistinguishably in a new form of "dictatorship of
well-being."[34] Certainly, this homogeneity in liberal democracy does not
spring from coercion or physical exclusion, but rather from the voter's
sense of futility. Official censorship is no longer needed as the
ostracism
resulting from political incorrectness becomes daily more obvious.
Citizens
appear more and more apathetic, knowing in all likelihood that, regardless
of their participation, the current power structure will remain intact.
Moreover, liberal democrats, as much as they complain about the
intolerance
of others, often appear themselves scornful of those who doubt liberal
doctrines, particularly the beliefs in rationalism and economic progress.
The French thinker Georges Sorel, who influenced Schmitt, remarked long
ago
that to protest against the illusion of liberal rationalism means to be
immediately branded as the enemy of democracy.[35] One must agree that,
irrespective of its relative tolerance in the past, liberal democracy
appears to have its own sets of values and normative claims. Its
adherents,
for example, are supposed to believe that liberal democracy operates
entirely by law. Julien Freund detects in liberal legalism "an irenic
concept" of law, "a juridical utopia . . . which ignores the real effects
of political, economic and other relations."[36] No wonder that Schmitt
and
his followers have difficulty in accepting the liberal vision of the rule
of law, or in believing that such a vision can "suspend decisive
[ideological] battle through endless discussion."[37] In its quest for a
perfect and apolitical society, liberal democracy develops in such a
manner
that "public discussion [becomes] an empty formality,"[38] reduced to
shallow discourse in which different opinions are no longer debated. A
modern liberal politician increasingly resembles an "entertainer" whose
goal is not to persuade the opponent about the validity of his political
programs, but primarily to obtain electoral majorities.[39]
In hindsight, it should not appear strange that liberal democracy, which
claims to be open to all kinds of technological, economic and sexual
"revolutions," remains opposed to anything that would question its
apolitical status quo. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that even the
word "politics" is increasingly being supplanted by the more anodyne word
"policy," just as prime ministers in liberal democracies are increasingly
recruited from economists and businessmen.
Schmitt correctly predicted that even the defeat of fascism and the recent
collapse of communism would not forestall a political crisis in liberal
democracy. For Schmitt, this crisis is inherent in the very nature of
liberalism, and will keep recurring even if all anti-liberal ideologies
disappeared. The crisis in liberal parliamentary democracy is the result
of
the contradiction between liberalism and democracy; it is, in Schmittian
language, the crisis of a society that attempts to be both liberal and
democratic, universal and legalistic, but at the same time committed to
the
self-government of peoples.
One does not need to go far in search of fields that may politicize and
then polarize modern liberal democracy. Recent events in Eastern Europe,
the explosion of nationalisms all around the world, racial clashes in the
liberal democratic West - these and other "disruptive" developments
demonstrate that the liberal faith may have a stormy future. Liberal
democracy may fall prey to its own sense of infallibility if it concludes
that nobody is willing to challenge it. This would be a mistake. For
neither the demise of fascism nor the recent collapse of communism has
ushered in a more peaceful epoch. Although Western Europe and America are
now enjoying a comfortable respite from power politics, new conflicts have
erupted in their societies, over multiculturalism and human rights. The
end
of liberal apolitical democracy and the return of "hard" politics may be
taking place within liberal democratic societies.
Notes:
- See Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Detroit: Wayne State
University
Press, 1962), 3. "In a somewhat paradoxical vein, democracy could be
defined as a high-flown name for something which does not exist." See, for
instance, the book by French "Schmittian" Alain de Benoist, Democratie: Le
probleme (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1985), 8. "Democracy is neither more
'modern' nor more 'evolved' than other forms of governance: Governments
with democratic tendencies have appeared throughout history. We can
observe
how the linear perspective used in this type of analysis can be
particularly deceiving." Against the communist theory of democracy, see
Julien Freund, considered today as a foremost expert on Schmitt, in
Politique et impolitique (Paris: Sirey, 1987), 203. "It is precisely in
the
name of democracy, designed as genuine and ideal and always put off for
tomorrow that non-democrats conduct their campaign of propaganda against
real and existing democracies." For an interesting critique of democratic
theory, see Louis Rougier, La Mystique democratique (Paris:
Albatros,1983).
Rougier was inspired by Vilfredo Pareto and his elitist anti-democratic
theory of the state. [Back]
- See, for instance, an analysis of U.S. "post-electoral politics," which
seems to be characterized by the governmental incapacity to put a stop to
increasing appeals to the judiciary, in Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin
Shefter, Politics by other Means: The Declining Importance of Election in
America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990). [Back]
- Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen
Kennedy (Cambridge: MIT,1985), 4. [Back]
- The views held by some leftist scholars concerning liberalism closely
parallel those of Schmitt, particularly the charge of "soft" repression.
See, for instance, Jurgen Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). See also Regis Debray , Le Scribe: Genese du
politique (Paris: Grasset, 1980). [Back]
- Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Munchen und Leipzig: Duncker
und Humblot, 1932), 36. Recently, Schmitt's major works have become
available in English. These include: The Concept of the Political, trans.
G. Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Prress, 1976); Political
Romanticism, trans. G. Oakes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); and Political
Theology, trans. G. Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press; 1985). There may be some
differences between my translations and the translations in the English
version. [Back]
- Schmitt, Der Begriff, 76. [Back]
- Francois-Bernard Huyghe, La soft-ideologie (Paris: Robert Laffont,
1987), 43 [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 8. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 15. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis ojParliamentary Democrary, 15. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 9. [Back]
- Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munchen und Leipzig: Verlag von
Duncker
und Humblot, 1928), 83. [Back]
- See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft), trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper & Row,
1963). Tonnies distinguishes between hierarchy in modern and traditional
society. His views are similar to those of Louis Dumont, Homo
Hierarchicus,
the Caste System and its Implications, trans. Mark Sainsbury and L. Dumont
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Dumont draws attention to
"vertical" vs. "horizontal" inequality among social groups. [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 234. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 9. [Back]
- Carl Schmitt, Du Politique, trans. William Gueydan (Puiseaux: Pardes,
1990), 46. Legalitat und Legitimitat appears in French translation, with a
preface by Alain de Benoist, as "L'egalite et legitimite" [Back]
- Schmitt, Du Politique, 57. [Back]
- Schmitt, Du Politique, 58. See also Schmitt's Verfassungslehre, 87-91: [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 245. [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 246. [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 245. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 10. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 13. [Back]
- See, for instance, the conservative revolutionary, Arthur Moeller van
den Bruck, Das Dritte Reich (1923) whose criticism of liberal democracy
often parallels Carl Schmitt's, and echoes Karl Marx, The Critique of the
Gotha Program, (New York: International Publishers, 1938), 9. "Hence equal
rights here (in liberalism) means in principle bourgeois rights. The equal
right is an unequal right for unequal labor." See also Schmitt's
contemporary Othmar Spann with a similar analysis, Der wahre Staat
(Leipzig: Verlag von Qnelle und Meyer,1921). [Back]
- See Carl Schmitt, "L'unite du monde," trans. Philippe Baillet in Du
Politique, 237-49. [Back]
- In some multi-ethnic states, liberal democracy has difficulty taking
root. For instance, the liberalisation of Yugoslavia has led to its
collapse into its ethnic parts. This could bring some comfort to Schmitt's
thesis that democracy requires a homogeneous "Volk" within its
ethnographic
borders and state. See Tomislav Sunic, "Yugoslavia, the End of Communism
the Return of Nationalism," America (20 April 1991), 438--440. [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 234. See for a detailed treatment of this
subject the concluding chapter of Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics
and Theory (Westport and New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 16, [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 28. [Back]
- Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 247. [Back]
- Carl Schmitt; "L'etat de droit bourgeois," in Du Politique, 35. [Back]
- Freund, Politique et impolitique, 204. [Back]
- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1966), vol. 2, book fourth, Ch. 6. [Back]
- There is a flurry of books criticizing the "surreal" and "vicarious"
nature of modern liberal society. See Jean Baudrillard, Les strategies
fatales ("Figures du transpolitique") (Paris: Grasset, 1983). Also,
Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Warner Books,
1979). [Back]
- Georges Sorel, Les illusions du progres (Paris: M. Riviere, 1947), 50. [Back]
- Freund, Politique et impolitique, 305. [Back]
- Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie (Munchen und Leipzig: Verlag von
Duncker und Humblot, 1934), 80. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 6. [Back]
- Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 7. [Back]
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